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Abstract 
In this paper, we consider the problem of locating an optimal package of public 
projects from a set of potential projects when the public projects have positive corn­
plementarities. We formulate the problem as a discrete nonlinear optimization problem 
whose domain equals the power set of a finite collection of projects. The main con­
tribution of this paper is the construction of an efficient algorithm, among the set of 
bottom-up algorithms, for projects with positive and positive uniform complementarities. 
The restriction to bottom-up algorithms sterns from practical considerations discussed 
in the paper. We also discuss shotcomings of three natural approaches to addressing 
the problem: exhaustive search over packages, simultaneous evaluation of projects, and 
sequential evaluation of projects. 
A BOTTOM-UP EFFICIENT ALGORITHM FOR 
ALLOC ATING PUBLIC P ROJECTS WITH 
POSITIVE COMPLEMENTARITIES 
Scott E. Page* 
1 Introduction 
Approaches to the problem of allocating public goods and deciding upon public projects 
take at least three forms. One branch of research concerns the design of mechanisms in 
which truthful revelation of preferences for a public good or package of public goods is 
incentive compatible (Groves and Ledyard 1977, Green and Laffont 1977).1 Recently, 
Moulin and Jackson (1992) have adopted this approach to the problem of making deci­
sions on public projects. A second branch concerns the construction of political institu­
tions to make decisions on public goods and projects (Inman 1988) . A third approach 
evaluates public projects using cost-benefit analysis (Dreze and Stern 1986) . 
In the case of public projects, the aforementioned models typically consider an indi­
vidual project or package of projects. They do not address the problem considered here: 
the selection of an optimal package of projects from a set of feasible projects given comple­
mentary effeds among projects. And yet, accepting the noncontroversial assumption that 
the values of many public projects are interdependent: for example, investments in road­
ways and public transportation increase the values of museums, parks, and stadia; this is 
the relevant economic problem. Though the aforemention_�models can be extended so 
that all packages of projects are evaluated and the best selected, the enormous number 
of potential packages which can be created from even a moderate number of projects, 
*Division of Humanities and Social Sciences 228-77, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena
CA 91125. This paper was a portion of the author's dissertation from Northwestern University. The 
author's committee members: Mark Satterthwaite, Roger Myerson, and Matthew Jackson and, especially 
his chairman, Stan Reiter, deserve many thanks for their support, guidance, and advice. Gordon Green 
and Mike Kirschenheiter commented on and improved several early versions of this paper. 
1 For an overview of solutions to the the problem of allocating public goods see Cornes and Sandler 
(1986) or Oakland (1987). 
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precludes preference revelation over the entire set of packages (Bergson 1976).2 More­
over, as we show in this paper; the assumption of complementary effects among projects 
implies that applying these mechanisms to evaluate projects either independently or in 
sequence will not necessarily locate the optimal package. 
In this paper, we restrict attention to public projects in which the complementarities 
are positive. There are three reasons for this restriction. First, to make the selection over 
packages of projects tractable, we cast the problem as a discrete nonlinear programming 
problem (Reiter and Sherman 1962). The general problem, in which arbitrary comple­
mentaries are allowed, is so large as to require decomposition into cases. Decades of 
combinatorial optimization theory demonstrates that no single institution, mechanism, 
or algorithm is efficient for all types of complementarities among projects. The relevant 
question becomes not whether to divide into classes but how to make the division. This 
leads to our second reason for concentrating on positive complementarities. It seems a 
logical initial class to consider. Many public projects, such as schools, infrastructure, 
and public transportation appear to create positive external effects. Finally, even though 
we assume that the exact value of the complementary effects cannot be known prior to 
evaluating projects, we might assume that the class of complementarities can be known. 
We might guess (correctly) that a sewer system surrounding an inland lake imposes a 
positive externality on nearby public parks and beaches, even though we might not know 
the size of the externality. Provided that the class of functions is known, the appropriate 
algorithm can be applied. 
This paper then can be interpreted as slicing off a class of complementarities and 
constructing an efficient algorithm for this class. This raises the question of what we mean 
by "efficient." We rely on the notion of bottom-up efficient which has three requirements: 
First, the algorithm must be weakly minimal in the number of packages evaluated, i.e. 
there cannot exist another algorithm which never evaluates more packages and sometimes 
evaluates fewer packages. Second, it must always locate the optimal package. Third, 
it must be bottom-up: in each iteration it only may add projects to the current best 
package of projects. The restriction to bottom..-up algorithms is motivated by practical 
consideratioqs discussed in section 2 of this paper. 
The main result of this paper is the construction of a bottom-up efficient algorithm for 
projects with positive complementarities and for projects with positive complementarities 
generated by a single project. We refer to the latter case as-the class of �nidirectional 
complementarities. 3 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, 
we formally define the multiple public projects problem as well as value functions defined 
by positive and positive unidirectional complementarities. We show that both classes of. 
functions belong to the class of quasi-supermodular functions. In Section 3, we define 
sequential and simultaneous evaluation of projects and demonstrate with an example 
21n the case of a Clarke mechanism (Clarke 1976), agents would be required to report a valuation for 
each �ubset of projects, which in the case of thirty projects would number over a billion. 
3 Although at this point our results take the form of an algorithm, we expect that insights gained 
from the algorithm can be incorporated into mechanisms or institutions. 
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how each may fail to locate the optimal package of projects. In Section 4 ,  we explore 
the problems of exploding and collapsing complexity. In Section 5, we present a formal 
characterization of bottom-up efficiency. In Section 6,  we construct an algorithm, ALGO­
BU, which is bottom-up efficient for projects with positive and positive unidirectional 
complementarities. In the final section, we demonstrate that ALGO-BU is not bottom­
up efficient for all subclasses of quasi-supermodular functions and discuss parallellizing 
the algorithm. 
2 The Multiple Public Projects Problem 
2.1 Preliminaries 
We assume that there are n potential projects and that the decision on each project takes 
the form of a simple "yes" or "no" (Harris 1978, Boeri 1990). Within this framework, a 
similar project at a different location or an otherwise identical project of larger size may 
be treated as a separate project. 4 
The set of projects, N = {1, 2, . . n} 
A package of projects is a subset of N and represents a decision on each project. 
A package of projects, X � N 
We denote the set of all possible packages by S. Sis just the power set of N. 
The set of packages, S = {X: X � N} 
We further assume that a value can be assigned to each package of projects and that 
there exists a government or social planner whose objective is to choose the package 
with the highest value. The value of a package may be interpreted as the aggregate of 
individual agents' valuations, as the value of a social welfare function defined over S, or 
as the outcome of cost-benefit analysis. Without loss of generality we assume that the 
value of providing no projects equals zero. 
The class of value functions, G � v0 = {V: V : S--+ R, V (0) = O} 
4However, it is unlikely that two similar projects confer positive externalities upon one another. 
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We further assume that there is an actual value function, '19 which belongs to G. We 
assume that the actual value function is not known a priori. Instead, it is revealed through 
the evaluation of packages of projects. When a package consists of costly projects, then 
undertaking these projects may cause a shift in the prices of private goods (Besley and 
Jewitt 1991, Harris 1978) . When this occurs, cost-benefit analysis can becomes prob­
lematic (Chipman and More 1978). Nevertheless, we assume that a well-defined value 
function exists. 
The actual value function, '19 E G 
Given our assumption of complementaries among projects, the value of a project 
depends upon which other projects belong to the package of projects to be undertaken. 
We distinguish between the value of a project alone, its isolated value, and its value in 
conjunction with other projects, its marginal value. 
The isolated value of project i E N, '19 ( { i}) 
The marginal value of project i EN given X C N, MV(i , X) = '19({i} U X)- '19(X) 
In the next subsection, we define positive complementarities among projects. Positive 
complementarities imply that the marginal value of a project is at least as large as 
its isolated value. For example, the combined value of Yellowstone National Park and 
the federal highways in Wyoming probably exceeds the sum of the isolated values of 
Yellowstone and the highways. 
In section 4 , we define a bottom-up efficient algorithm, ALGO-BU, for functions 
formed by positive complementarities (POS) and functions formed by positive unidirec­
tional complementarities (UNI). In order to define these classes of complementarities, we 
first define the decomposition basis (Liepins and Vose 1991). 
Given V : S -+ �' there exists a unique vector f3v = (/3v,0, /3v,1, ... /3v,N) indexed over
I � N where /3v,1 E � and
V(X) = L /3v,1 V X � N
I<;_X 
f3v are the decomposition basis coefficients for V,
4 
The decomposition basis is best understood through an example. Consider a com­
munity which is deciding whether to build a school, a library, both projects together, or 
neither project. Suppose that the school's isolated value equals four million dollars, that 
the library's isolated value equals negative two million dollars, and that the value of the 
two projects together equals five million dollars. 
Example: N = {school, library} 
1?(0) = 0 1?({ school}) = 4 1?( {library}) = -2 1?( {school, library}) = 5 
The decomposition basis coefficients are computed as follows: the coefficient of an indi­
vidual project equals the project's isolated value; and the coefficient for a pair of projects 
equals the difference between the pair's value and the sum of the coefficients (the isolated 
values) of the two projects. 
/3fJ,0 = 0 /3fJ,{achool} = 4 /3fJ,{ library} = -2 /3fJ{.!choo/,library} = 3
The decomposition basis can be used to define the class of value functions formed by 
positive and the class formed by positive unidirectional complementarities. 
2.2 Positive and Positive Unidirectional Complementarities 
The class of value functions formed by positive complementarities, which we denote by 
POS, is characterized by two features. First, the isolated value of each project is bounded 
from below .. Second, all nonlinear effects, as measured by the decomposition basis, are 
positive. An implication of the second assumption is that any project with a positive 
isolated value also has a positive marginal value given any package of projects. 
POS = {V E V0 : 3 () E �+ such that /3v,r satisfy (i) and (ii)}
(i) -0 � /3v,1 
(ii) /3v,1 � 0
for I s.t. I I I= 1 
for I s.t. I I I > 1 
We next define the class of value functions formed by positive unidirectional comple­
mentarities, which we denote by UNI. This class of value functions characterizes public 
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projects in which a single project (project 1) confers a positive complementary effect 
on the other N - 1 projects, ·whose values are otherwise independent. For example, a 
dam upstream from a series of public parks separated by great distances may increase 
the parks' values by regulating flows, while the values of the parks may be otherwise 
independent. 
UNI = {V E V0 : 3 0 E �+ such that f3v,1 satisfy (i} - (iii}}
(i) -0 ::::; f3v,1 
(ii) f3v,1 = 0 
(iii) f3v,1 2:: 0 
for I s.t. I I I= 1 
if I I 12:: 2 and 1 � I 
if I I 12:: 2 and 1 E I 
Observe that if a value function V belongs to UNI then it also belongs to POS but that 
the converse does not hold, so UNI is a strict subset of POS. To simplify the analysis, we 
first show that both POS and UNI belong to the class of quasi-supermodular functions, 
QSM, which is defined as follows: 
QSM = {V: V E  V0, V satisfies (i)-(ii}}
(i) V(X) 2:: V(X n Y) :::} V(X UY) 2:: V(Y) \/ X, Y � N
(ii) V(X) > V(X n Y) ::::} V(X UY) > V(Y) \/ X, Y � N
In fact, both classes of functions are supermodular, an even stronger condition (Topkis 
1976 , Fisher, etal. 1978) . Supermodularity is a discrete analog to a positive second 
derivative. The class of supermodular functions, SM, is defined as follows: 
SM = {V: V E V0, V(X) - V(X n Y) ::::; V(X UY) - V(Y)\/ X, Y � N}
We rely only on quasi-supermodularity in our analysis. 
3 Simultaneous and Sequential Evaluation 
A natural approach to the multiple public projects problem is to evaluate the projects 
simultaneously and to undertake those projects with positive isolated values. We will 
refer to this as simultaneous evaluation of projects. Alternatively, the projects might be 
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evaluated in sequence with those projects with positive marginal values given previous 
projects being undertaken. We will refer to this as sequential evaluation of projects. In 
this section, we formalize both of these approaches and demonstrate through an example 
that both may result in suboptimal packages of projects being undertaken. 
The two approaches fail for different reasons. Simultaneous evaluation considers only 
the isolated values of projects. Therefore, a project with a negative isolated value but 
which confers massive positive complementarities will not be undertaken. Sequential 
evaluation, on the other hand, does take into account some, though not all, complemen­
tarities between projects. For instance, if a project with a negative isolated value confers 
substantial positive complementarities on projects not yet considered, then it will not be 
undertaken. 
The following example serves three purposes. First, it formalizes what we mean 
by both sequential and simultaneous evaluation of projects. Second, it formalizes the 
intuition described above as to how both approaches may fail to locate the optimal 
package. Third, it provides an example of a value function which belongs to the class 
UNI. 
Example: N = {1, 2, 3} 
V(0) = 0 
V({l, 2}) = 1 
V({1})=2 
V( {1, 3}) = 4 
V({2}) = -3 
V({2, 3}) = -4 
V({3}) = -1 
V({l, 2 , 3}) = 6 
First, we consider simultaneous evaluation of projects. Each project is evaluated 
in isolation. The only project with a positive isolated value is project 1. Therefore, 
simultaneous evaluation leads to the provision of only the first project. It failed to 
locate the optimal package because it could not measure the complementarities between 
projects. Turning now to sequential evaluation of projects, we first place the projects in 
an order. For convenience, we assume that the projects are ordered 1,2 ,3. Project 1 is 
undertaken because it has a positive isolated value. Project 2 is not undertaken because 
its marginal value given project 1 equals -1. Project 3, however, has a marginal value of 2 
given project 1, so it is undertaken. Therefore, sequential search leads to the undertaking 
of the package {1,3}. The optimal package, {1,2 ,3}, is not located because project 2 only 
has a positive marginal value when both projects 1 and 3 are being undertaken. 
4 Complexity 
The value functions discussed so far are all nonlinear. In this section, we discuss the mea­
surement of nonlinearity for the multiple public projects problem. Our most important 
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conclusion is that measures which rely upon counting the number of variables compris­
ing the nonlinear effects may be inaccurate. Suppose that we restrict complementarities 
to pairs of projects. In other words, there do not exist external effects between larger 
subsets of projects. Two would be a natural choice for the size of the resulting value 
function. We show that this measurement may be misleading. On the one hand, simple 
nonlinear effects may combine to form complex problems. To demonstrate this point1 we 
construct what we refer to as a set of collective public projects, in which no strict subset 
of projects has a positive value, but in which the set of all projects merits undertaking. 
On the other hand, large nonlinear effects between many variables may be irrelevant for 
optimization. Our analysis consists of three parts. First, we define the decomposition 
size of a value function, which formalizes the notion of size just discussed. Second, we 
demonstrate through two examples and a claim how this measure may confuse potential 
and relevant complexity. And finally, we mention an alternative notion of complexity, 
cover size which relates to the number of project decisions which must be coordinated in 
order to locate the optimal package of projects (Page 1993) . 
Decomposition size is calculated using the decomposition basis coefficients defined in 
the previous section. The decomposition size of a value function V equals the cardinality 
of the largest subset which has a nonzero decomposition basis coefficient. 
The decomposition size of V, sized(V) = max {I I I : I � N, f3v,1 ¥- 0} 
In the example of Section 2 which included the school and the library, the decompo­
sition size of the value function would equal two because the subset consisting of both 
the school and the library had a positive decomposition basis coefficient. Decomposition 
size measures nonlinearity by the size of the encoded nonlinear effects. The two examples 
which follow help to clarify this notion of complexity and demonstrate weaknesses of 
decomposition size as a measure. 
Example: N = {1, 2 ,  3} Let f3v,1 =I I I V I� N. Therefore, 
V(0) = 0 
V( {1, 2}) = 4 
V({l})=l 
V({l, 3})=4 
V( {2}) = 1 V( {3}) = 1 
V( {2, 3}) = 4 _J4_{1, 2 ,  3}) = 12 
Though this function has a decomposition size of three, it is not difficult to solve. 
Either simultaneous or sequential evaluation of projects locates the optimal package. 
The complementarities between projects are irrelevant in that the isolated values of the 
projects are sufficient information for optimization. 
The example below has a smaller decomposition size, yet we argue that it is more 
complex. In this example, each project has a negative isolated value, but there are 
positive complementarities between pairs of projects. 
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Example: N = {1, 2, 3 , 4} Define /3v,1 as follows: 
Therefore, 
/3v,J = -4
/3v,J = 3
/3v,J = 0 
V(0) = 0 
V(X) = -4 
V(X) = -5 
V(X) = -3 
V(N) = 2 
if I I I = 1 
if I I I = 2 
else 
if Ix I = 1 
if Ix I = 2 
if Ix I = 3 
In this example, the decomposition size of the function equals two. However, neither 
simultaneous nor sequential evaluation of projects locates the optimal package of projects. 
In fact, each will lead to no projects being undertaken. This function is clearly more 
difficult to optimize than the function in the previous example, yet it has a smaller 
decomposition size. This example serves a second purpose as well. When every proper 
subset of projects has a negative value yet the set of all projects has a positive value, we 
say that the value function forms a set of collective public projects. 
A value function, V forms a set of collective public projects if the following two strict 
inequalities hold: 
V(X) < 0 V X c N, X -:f 0 
V( N) > V(0) = 0 
We now show that this contrived example can be extended to allow for any number 
of projects. Claim ?? states that for any positive integer n, there exists a value function 
defined over n projects with a decomposition size of two which forms a set of collective 
public projects. 
Claim 4.1 For any positive integer n and set of projects N, such that I N I= n, 3 V : 
S --+ � s.t. sized(V) = 2 and V forms a set of collective public projects of size n. 
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pf: If n = 2, the proof is trivial. Therefore, assume that n � 3. Define the decomposition 
basis coefficients of V as follows: 
Therefore, 
/3v,I 
/3v,I 
/3v,I 
= -1 
4 
2n-3 
if I I I= 1 
if I I I= 2 
V (0) = 0 
V (X) = -1 
=0 else 
V (X) = 
2 Ix I (Ix I -1) 
Ix I 2n - 3
V (N) = 
2n 7:_ 3
if Ix I= 1 
if 1 <Ix I< n 
It is straightforward to show that V (X) < 0 for 0 C X C N and that V (N) > 0. 
The constructive proof of Claim ?? shows how simple complementary effects may 
combine to form complex value functions. The size of the encoded effects therefore may 
not be an appropriate measure of the relevant complexity for optimization. Page (1993) 
has proposed an alternative measure of the amount of nonlinearity, or complexity, called 
cover size. Loosely speaking, a cover for a function determines the extent to which a 
problem can be decomposed into subproblems which can be solved in parallel. The size 
of a cover equals the number of decisions in the largest subproblem. For example, the 
function in the first example in this section can be decomposed into three subproblems, 
each consisting of one project. Its cover size equals one. In contrast, the function in the 
second exam.pie in this section cannot be decomposed at all, all four projects must be 
considered together. 5 Therefore, this function has a cover size of four. 
5 Bottom-Up Efficiency 
Algorithmic performance may be measured by the number of searches required to lo­
cate the optimum package, or the number of searches required to locate and verify the 
optimum package. We rely on the latter criterion because it is more reasonable. If, for 
example, the optimal package consisted of no projects being undertaken, we would like to 
know -how many projects would be evaluated before this fact was recognized. Our notion 
5Evaluation of any proper subset of projects would lead to that package of projects not being 
undertaken. 
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of efficiency also includes a criterion pertaining to the method of search: we require that 
our algorithm be bottom-up. An algorithm is bottom-up if any package of projects to be 
evaluated is a superset of the current best package of projects. In the example with the 
school and the library, a bottom-up algorithm which first evaluates the school must then 
evaluate the school and the library as a package. It cannot evaluate the library alone. 
This follows from the fact that the school has a positive value. 
The restriction to bottom-up algorithms is motivated by four practical considerations 
specific to the multiple public projects problem. First, decisions on some public projects 
may be required before the entire set of potential projects is known to the decision 
maker. For example, in the United States, decisions on where to build federal highways 
were made long before projects such as the supercollider once under construction in Texas 
were even part of the choice set. Second, evaluating the costs and benefits of an addition 
to an existing package of projects at a given level of accuracy should be more precise and 
less costly than evaluating the costs and benefits of an addition to a hypothetical package 
of projects.6 Third, decisions on public projects are often made by different government 
sectors. A bottom-up algorithm can be "parallellized" to a some degree as we discuss 
in the conclusion. Finally, once a project has been undertaken, the political costs of 
abandoning the project may be significant. The supercollider notwithstanding, projects 
may persist even though their costs outweigh their benefits. 
Bottom-up efficiency differs from standard notions of algorithmic efficiency in that it 
emphasizes more than just the number, or the order of the number of searches. ALGO­
BU is not, in general, efficient in the traditional sense. For problems with positive 
complementarities, the Ford-Fulkerson algorithm, which is not bottom-up, evaluates a 
number of packages which is polynomial in the number of projects (Ford and Fulker­
son 1962). In comparison, for some functions ALGO-BU searches the entire space of 
packages, which is exponential in the number of projects. 
In order to define an algorithm, we need to be explicit about what information is 
known prior to and during search. We assume prior knowledge of the class of functions 
from which t.he actual value function is drawn, but no prior knowledge of the likelihood 
of any particular function being drawn. During an algorithm's search, the evaluated 
packages provide additional information about the actual value function. We assume 
that an algorithm maintains a record of the packages which have been evaluated and 
their function values which it uses to determine which package to evaluate next. 
Note that the definition of a record does not include the restriction that the Xi's are 
6This assumption can be motivated with an example. Suppose that the first project is a public transit 
system. Total usage of a hypothetical transit system is a random variable with substantial variation. In 
contrast, once the transit system has been built, total usage is hard data. Less uncertainty should imply 
less costly and more precise predictions of the effects of future projects. 
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unique. Therefore, two distinct value functions can have identical records provided that 
some package is represented more than once in each record. In fact, for the algorithms 
we construct, prior to any package evaluations, all of the Xi's in a record will equal the 
empty set. To simplify the discussion, each package in a record and its value will be 
referred to as an entry. 
An algorithm's choice of the next package to be evaluated is determined by a search 
rule. A search rule maps a record into the set of packages. If the search rule maps into 
the empty set, the search stops. The search rule takes into account the class of functions 
from which iJ was drawn. 
The set of search rules, R = {T: T: A(iJ) x G--+ S1 iJ E G} 
An algorithm applied to iJ E G consists of an initial package T1 and a search rule TA· 
An algorithm applied to iJ E G, A = (T1, TA) with T1 C N and TA E R. Search is 
defined as follows: 
Step 0: 
Step 1: 
Step 2: 
Step 3: 
Step 4: 
Step 5: 
A(iJ) i = (0, iJ(0)) 
i = 1 
Ti r:;;_ N 
Evaluate Ti r:;;_ N 
Ai(V) = (1i, iJ(Ti) )  
if TA(A(iJ) , G) = 0 
if rA (A(iJ) , G) = X 
i=i+ l  
Ti= X 
goto Step 1 
num(A, iJ, G) = i 
for i = 1 to 2n 
{iteration number} 
goto Step 5 
goto Step 4 
Ti( A ,  iJ, G) denotes the ith package evaluated by A when A is applied to iJ in G. 
The ith package evaluated by A given iJ in G, Ti( A ,  '19, G) 
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The number of searches by A for t9 in G equals the number of packages which are 
evaluated when the algorithm is applied to t9 in G. 
The number of searches by A for t9 in G ,  num(A, t9 ,  G) 
Two algorithms are said to be equivalent for G if they create identical records for all 
t9 in G .  
A and A are equivalent algorithms, A =  A, i.ffTi (A, t9 ,  G) =Ti( A, t9 ,  G) for all t9 E G 
and all is; m ax{num(A, t9 , G), num( A, t9 ,G)} 
The best package up to m iterations of A is the package among the first m - 1 
packages evaluated for which t9 has the highest value. If more than one package has the 
highest value, then the last package evaluated from among those with the highest value 
is considered best. 
The best package up tom iterations of A ,  B m(A, t9 ,  G) satisfies (i) - (iii)
(i) 
(ii )  
(iii) 
B m(A, t9 , G) = Ti(A, t9 , G) 
t9 (B m(A, t9 ,  G) ) 2: t9 (Ti (A, t9 ,  G)) 
t9(B m(A, t9 ,  G)) > t9(Tk(A, t9 ,  G)) 
for some i < m 
\I j < i
\I k s.t. i < k < m 
Bottom-up efficiency consists of three conditions. The first condition is that the 
algorithm be optimizing over G .  
An algorithm A is optimizing over G iff\I t9 E G ,  t9 (Bn•(A, t9 ,  G) ) > t9 (X) \IX � N,
where n* = num(A, t9 ,  G) 
The second condition is that the algorithm be bottom-up which requires that each Ti 
contain the best package up to i. The bottom-up condition can be interpreted as not 
allowing the abandonment of a project which belongs to the current best package. 
A is bottom-up in G iff B m(A, t9 ,  G) � Tm( A,  t9 ,  G) \Im s; num(A, t9 ,  G) \I t9 E G 
Hereafter, B m(A , t9 ,  G) and Ti ( A, t9 ,  G) are denoted by Em and Ti respectively. The 
third condition for bottom-up efficiency is that the algorithm be weakly minimal in the 
13 
number of projects evaluated, i.e. if G is the class of functions under consideration, given 
any other bottom-up, optimizing algorithm, A, there exists a function V in G such that 
A relies on strictly fewer searches than A. 
An algorithm A is bottom-up efficient for a class of functions G if it satisfies (i)-(iii):
(i) A is optimizing over G
(ii) A is bottom-up in G
(iii) if A¢. A and A satisfies (i) and (ii), then 3 V E G such that
num( A ,  V, G) < num( A, V, G)
In the next section we define an algorithm ALGO-BU which we later show to be 
bottom-up efficient for POS and UNI. 
6 ALGO-BU 
In this section, we construct a bottom-up algorithm, ALGO-BU, which is optimizing 
for QSM and bottom-up efficient for both POS and UNI. ALGO-BU can be described 
as follows: First, the packages of projects are ordered using the standard map from S 
into the integers. Second, the packages are "considered" for evaluation according to that 
order. ALGO-BU evaluates a considered package if and only if the strong dominating 
set of the package is empty given the values of previously evaluated packages. 7 
6.1 Dominated Projects 
Before defining ALGO-BU, we define undominated packages of projects. We will show 
in an example that undominated is a weaker restriction than having a nonempty strong 
dominating set. Let G be a class of value functions. A package of projects, X, is 
undominated in G if there exists a value function V which belongs to G such that X is 
the unique maximizer of V. 
A package X � N is  undominated in G if 3 V E G s.t. V (X) > V (Y) \/ Y � N ,
Y#X. 
7To determine whether or not the strong dominating set of a package is empty entails solving a 
linear programming problem. For fewer than a hundred projects, these computational costs will be 
inconsequential compared to the costs of evaluating the benefits and costs of the package of projects. 
14 
Alternatively a package X is dominated in G if for any value function, V, which 
belongs to G, there exis ts a package which has at least as high a value under V. 
A package X � N is dominated in G ifV VE G 3 Y "f- X s. t. V(Y) � V(X)
As mentioned above, ALCO-BU evaluates a package only if has an empty strong 
dominating s et. The s trong dominating s et is defined relative to a class of feasible value 
functions G. The s trong dominating s et of a package X in G cons ists of all packages Y 
which s atis fy three conditions: first, for any function V which belongs G, V(Y) mus t be 
at least as large as V(X) ;s econd, Y mus t s trictly contain X; and third, for any package 
W containing X and contained in Y ,  V(W) cannot be larger than V(Y ). 
The strong dominating set of X in G, SD(X, G) 
(i ) - (i i i ) } 
(i) V(X) � V(Y) 
(ii) x c y 
(iii) X c W c Y => V(W) � V(Y) 
{Y Y � N Y satisfies 
V: VE G 
VVE G 
Corollary ?? shows that if the s trong dominating s et of X in G is not empty then X 
is dominated. 
Corollary 6.1 SD(X, G) "f- 0 => X dominated in G VG� V0.
pf: YE SD(X, G) => V(Y) � V(X) V VE G. 
The implication does not hold in the other direction as is shown by the following 
example: 
Example: Let N = {1 , 2, 3} and let P = {V : V E POS, and V(2 3) = 10 }. It is easy
to show PC QSM. Therefore, V({l }) < V({l , 2, 3} )VV E P . By definition, {1 } is
dominated in P . However, SD({l } , P ) = 0. 
Claim ?? states that if both Y and Z belong to SD(X, G), and if Y is a s ubset of Z, 
then Z belongs to the s trong dominating s et of Y in G. 
Claim 6.1 Y, Z E SD(X, G) and Y � Z => Z E SD(Y, G) VG� v0
1 5
pf: Y E SD(X, G) implies X � Y. By assumption, Y � Z. Therefore, Z E SD(X, G) 
implies V(Y) $ V(Z). Finally� given that X � Y, it follows immediately that {W: Y C 
WC Z} � {W: X CW CZ}, which completes the proof. 
Hereafter, we assume that G is contained in QSM. Claim?? states that if Y belongs 
to the strong dominating set of X and Z belongs to the strong dominating set of Y,  then 
Z belongs to the strong dominating set of X. In other words, belonging to the strong 
dominating set is a transitive relation. 
Claim 6.2 Y E  SD(X, G), Z E SD(Y, G) :::} Z E SD(X, G) VG � QSM 
pf: It suffices to show that Z satisfies conditions (i)-(iii) in the definition of SD(X, G). 
The proof consists of three parts. 
Part 1 :  V(X) $ V(Z) V V E G
pf of part 1 :  Y E  SD(X, G), Z E SD(Y, G):::} V(X) < V(Y) $ V(Z) V V E  G 
Part 2:  X CZ 
pf of part 2: Y E  SD(X, G), Z E SD(Y, G) :::} X c Y C Z 
Part 3: X c W c Z:::} V(W) $ V(Z) V V E G
pf of part 3: · Let W � N, s. t. X c W c Z. It follows that X � Y n W. Therefore,
Y E SD(X, G) implies V(Y) 2 V(Y n W) V V E G. By assumption, G � QSM. 
Therefore, V(W U Y) 2 V(W) V V E G. Finally, Z E SD(Y, G) and W � Z which 
together imply V(Z) 2 V(W UY) V V E G. Therefore, V(Z) 2 V(W). 
Claim ?? states that if Y belongs to the strong dominating set of X in G and if X is 
contained in Y, then either Y is contained in Y or the union of Y and Y belongs to the
strong dominating set of Y in G. 
Claim 6.3 VG � QSM. If Y E  SD(X, G) and X � Y, then one of the following must 
hold: 
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(i) y � y 
(ii) Yu Y E SD(Y, G) 
pf: Suppose that (i) does not hold. It suffices to show Y U  Y satisfies conditions (i)-(iii)
in the definition of SD(X, G). The proof consists of three parts. 
Part 1: V(Y) � V(Y UY) V V E G 
pf of part 1: Y E SD(X, QSM) ::::} X C Y. By assumption, X � Y. Therefore, 
X � Y n Y � Y and V(Y n Y) � V(Y). G � QSM::::} V(l,.) � V(Y u Y) V V E  G. 
Part 2: Y � Y U Y 
pf of part 2:  follows directly. 
Part 3: Y C WC Y U  Y::::} V(W) � V(Y UY) V V E  G
pf of part 3: Choose w � N s.t. y c w c y u Y. It follows that x � y n w � Y. By
assumption, Y E SD(X, G), which implies V(Y) 2: V(Y n W) V V E G. Furthermore, 
G � QSM implies V(YUW) 2: V(W) VV E G. Finally, Y �W and W c Y UY which
together imply Y U  W =Y U Y, which completes the proof. 
A corollary of Claim ?? and Claim?? is that if both Y and Y belong to SD(X, G), 
then their union also belongs to SD(X, G). 
Corollary 6.2 : VG � QSM, Y, Y E SD(X, G) ::::} Y U  Y E SD(X, G) 
pf: Y E  SD(X, G) and X � Y. Therefore, by Claim?? , one of the following must hold: 
(i) y � y 
(ii) Yu Y E SD(Y, G). 
If (i) holds, the proof is complete. Therefore, (ii) holds. By assumption, Y E SD(X, G) 
and by Claim?? , Y U  Y E SD(X, G). 
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We refer to the union of all of the packages in SD(X, G) as the strong dominating 
package of X in G. 
The strong dominating package of X in G, D(X, G) � N, equals the union of the 
packages in SD(X, G) . 
D(X, G) = u y
YESD (X,G) 
Corollary ?? states that the strong dominating package of X in G belongs to the 
strong dominating set of X in G. 
Corollary 6.3 D(X, G) E SD(X, G) VG� QSM 
pf: Follows from Corollary ?? . 
Claim ?? states that the strong dominating set of X in G is empty if and only if the 
dominating package of X in G equals the empty set. 
Claim 6.4 SD(X, G) = 0 ¢:? D(X, G) = 0 VG� QSM 
pf: follows from the definition of D(X, G) and Corollary ?? . 
Corollary ?? states that if the dominating package of X in G is the empty package, 
and if Y is a subset of X, then X contains the dominating package of Y in G. 
Corollary 6.4 D(X, G) = 0::::} VY� X, D(Y, G) � X VG� QSM 
pf: If D(Y, G) = 0, the proof is complete. Suppose D(Y, G) =/:- 0. By assumption, Y � X. 
By Corollary ?? , D(Y, G) E S D(Y, G) . Therefore, by Claim ?? , one of the following must 
hold: 
( i) D(Y, G) � X 
(ii) D(Y, G) U X E SD(X, G) 
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By Claim ??, D(X, G) = 0 implies that SD(X, G) = 0. If X # 0, then (i) holds. 
Therefore, we need only consider the case that X = 0. However, X = 0 implies that 
X = Y, which completes the proof. 
Corollary ?? states that for any package X, the strong dominating set of D(X, G) in 
G equals the empty set provided that G is contained in QSM. 
Corollary 6.5 SD(D(X, G), G) = D(D(X, G) ) = 0 VG� QSM 
pf: Suppose Y # 0 and Y E SD(D(X, G), G) . It follows from Claim ?? that Y E 
SD(X, G). Therefore, Y � D(X, G) , a contradiction. By Claim??, D(D(X, G) = 0. 
6.2 ALGO-BU 
We now define ALGO-BU(G) for G � QSM. ALGO-BU first orders the packages and 
then considers the packages in that order. ALGO-BU evaluates a package only if its 
strong dominating set is empty. To determine whether this is the case requires solving a 
linear programming problem. To describe ALGO-BU, we first define the index function, 
which is the standard mapping from S into the integers. 
The index function, index: S-+ {O, 1, 2n - 1} according to the following rule: 
index(X) = L 2(i-t)
iEX 
Example: If n = 3 the ordering created by the index function is: 
index( { 0}) = 0 index( { 1}) = 1 index( {2}) = 2 index( {1,2}) = 3 
index( {3}) = 4 index( {1,3}) = 5 index( {2,3}) = 6 index( {1,2,3}) = 7 
In the first iteration ALGO-BU evaluates the first nonempty package in the ordering 
created by index, which is {1}. To determine the second package evaluated by ALGO­
BU, we need to define the set of functions in G consistent with {} up to j. 
The set of functions in G consistent with {} up to j, fi ( {}, G) is defined as follows:
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r1(t9, G) = G
ri(t? , G) ={V E G: A(V)i = A(t?)i Jor i= 1 to j - l }  for j > 1
In the second iteration, ALGO-BU considers the next package in the ordering created 
by index, which is {2}. The package {2} is evaluated only if SD( {2}, f 2(t9 ,  G)) is empty. 
If, for example, {1,2} belongs to SD( {2}, f 2(t9 ,  G)), then {2} cannot be the optimal
package if G is contained in QSM. Therefore, ALGO-BU moves to the next package 
in the ordering created by index, which is {1,2}. The package {1-,2} is evaluated only 
if SD( {1, 2}, r2(t9 ,  G)) is empty. This process continues until ALGO-BU considers a
package X such that SD(X, r2(t9,  G)) equals the empty set. X is the second package
evaluated by ALGO-BU, which we denote by T 2• 
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ALGO-BU applied to{) in G :  ALGO-BU({) ,  G) = ( {1}, r) 
Step 0: 
Step 1: 
Step 2: 
Step 3A: 
Step 3B: 
Step 4: 
Step 5: 
A( Y)i = (0, Y( O) ) 
i = 1
dex = 1
Evaluate Ti � N 
Ai ( .,'J) =(Ti ,  .,'J(Ti) )  
dex = dex + 1
if dex > 2n goto Step 5
if dex :::; 2n choose X s. t. in dex(X) = dex
If S D(X, fi ( .,'J, G))  :/: 0
else r( A( .,'J) , G) = X 
i =i +l 
Ti =X 
goto Step 1 
num( ALGO-BU, {) , G) = i
end 
for i = 1 to 2n 
{iteration number} 
{index number} 
goto Step 3A 
goto Step 4 
By the construction of ALGO-BU, each package is considered only once. We let t(X) 
denote the iteration i n  which ALGO-BU considers X. 
The iteration of X in ALCO- BU, t(X) = min{j : in dex(Tj )  2: in dex(X) }
The following series of claims are used to show that ALGO-BU is bottom-up and 
optimizing for QSM. Claim?? states that as more packages are evaluated by ALGO-BU, 
the set of functions in G consistent with {) up to j cannot increase. 
Claim 6.5 J > j � r3( '!9, G) � fi ( '!9, G) V G � yo V '!9  E G 
pf: Let Y E  fi ( .,'J, G) .  By construction, Y(Ti) = '!9(Ti) for i < J. Given that J > j ,  it
follows that Y(Ti) = '!9(Ti) for i < j. Therefore, YE fi( 19, G }.-
A corollary of Claim ?? is that the set S D(X, fi ) does not decrease as j increases. 
Corollary 6.6 j > j � S D(X, fJ( .,'J, G) )  � S D(X, fi ( .,'J, G)) V G � yo V '!9  E G 
pf: Follows from Claim ?? . 
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Claim ?? states that if the strong dominating set of X is not empty at t(X) , and
further that if X is contained 'in a package which is later evaluated , then there exists a
package Ti which belongs to the strong dominating set of X in fi ( 19, G). Note that this
and future claims require that G is contained in QSM. In the proof of Claim?? and in all
subsequent proofs, S D(X ,I'i ( 19,· ) )  is abbreviated as S D(X ,j) .  Similarly D(X ,I'i ( 19,·) )  
i s  abbreviated as D(X ,j) . 
Claim 6.6 Let G � QSM and 19 E G .  Suppose that X C Ti for some j and that
S D(X ,I' t(X) (t? ,G) )  =/:- 0. It follows that 3 T ; �Ti s.t. T ;  E S D(X ,r3( 19,G) )
pf: S D(X , t(X))  =I- 0 => D(X ,  t(X))  =I- 0. By Corollary ?? , D(X ,)) =/:- 0 V J  > t (X) .  
There are two possible cases: 
Case 1 :  3 J � j s.t. index( D(X ,}) ) � index(T ;) 
pf of case 1 :  By Corollary ?? , S D( D(X ,]) ,J) = 0. It follows that T ;  = D(X ,J) . By
Corollary ?? , S D(Tj ,j) = 0 => S D(Tj ,]) = 0. Therefore, by Claim?? , T ;  � Tj . 
Case 2: V J< j, index( D(X ,]) )  > index(T;) 
pf of Case 2: index ( D(X ,j) ) > index(Tj) which implies D(X ,j) � Tj . However, by 
Claim?? , D(X ,j) U Tj E S D(Tj ,j) , a contradiction. 
Corollary?? states that the intersection of any two packages evaluated by ALGO-BU 
was also evaluated . 
Corollary 6. 7 Let G � QSM and 19 E G. Suppose X = T in Tj for some i and j. It
follows that S D(X , rt(X) (t? , G)) = 0
pf: Suppose S D(X , t(X))  =I- 0. By Claim ?? , X � Ti implies 3 T ;  � Ti s. t. T ;  E
S D(X ,J) . Similarly, 3 T :  � T i  s. t. T :  E S D(X , i) . Without loss of generality, assume
i < J. By Corollary ?? , T ; UT ; E S D(X ,i) .  By Claim?? it follows that T ; � Tj and
T ;  �T i. Which together imply that T ; = T ;  = X. 
Corollary ?? is used in the proof that ALGO-BU is bottom-up and in subsequent 
proofs. It states that the best package up to m has at least as large a value as any 
package which it contains. 
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Corollary 6.8 Let G � QSM and fJ E G. If VE rm( rJ, G), then if X � B m, V(B m) 2:
V(X) . 
pf: By construction B m  = Ti for some j < m. If S D(X, t(x ) )  = 0 then the proof is
complete by the definition of Em. Suppose S D(X, t(X)) '# 0. By Claim?? , it follows
that :3 T ;  s. t. T y  E S D(X, }) such that T ;  � B m  and V(B m) 2: V(Tj )  which completes
the proof. 
Claim ?? and Claim ?? state that if G is contained in QSM, then for any fJ belonging
to G, ALGO-BU applied to {) is bottom-up and optimizing. 
Claim 6. 7 Let G � QSM and fJ E G. ALGO-BU applied to fJ is bottom-up.
pf: Suppose Bi rt Ti . By Corollary ?? , Bi n Ti = T i  for some i < j. By Corollary ?? , 
V(Bi) ;:::: V(T i) ·  By assumption, fi ( fJ, G) � QSM. Therefore, given that V(Bj )  2:
V(T i) 'v'V E fi , it follows that V(Ti UBi) 2: V(Ti) 'v'V E fi . This implies S D(Ti , j) '# 0,
a contradiction. 
Claim 6.8 Let G � QSM and fJ E G. ALGO-BU is optimizing for fJ. 
pf: Choose X � N s. t. d(X) ;:::: fJ(Y) 'v' Y � N and fJ(X) > i?(Y) 'v' Y � N s.t. X c Y. 
It is straightforward to show that 19 E QSM implies that X is unique. It follows that
S D(X, j) = 0 for all j. Therefore, :3 j s. t. Ti = X, which completes the proof. 
Claim?? and Claim?? state that ALGO-BU is bottom-up efficient for POS and UNI 
respectively . .  The proofs to these claims rely on the construction of minimal reductions 
of value functions and are contained in an appendix. 
Claim 6.9 ALGO-BU is bottom-up efficient for POS. 
pf: See appendix. 
Claim 6.10 ALGO-BU is bottom-up efficient for UNI. 
pf: See appendix. 
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7 Discussion 
Claim ?? and Claim ?? state that ALGO-BU is bottom-up and optimizing for QSM. 
The example below demonstrates that ALGO-BU is not bottom-up efficient for all 
subclasses of QSM. However, it remains an open question as to whether ALGO-BU 
is bottom-up efficient for the entire class QSM.8 
Example: N = {1, 2 ,  .. . 9}. G = {V: V E  QSM, and satisfies (i)-(iv) } 
(i )  V({l}) < O
(ii) V({2}) > 0 
(iii) V( { 1}) = -O.x1x2x 3x 4 Xi =/:- 2 and Xi =/:- Xj for i =/:- j 
(iv) {2, x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4} maximizes V 
Condition (iii) implies that if V( {1}) = 0. 6374, then the optimal package is {2,3,4, 6, 7}. 
It is straightforward to show that an algorithm which evaluates the package { 1} first 
and then immediately evaluates the optimal package is bottom-up efficient. ALGO-BU 
does not evaluate package {1} because {1,2} belongs to SD( {1 }, G). In this example, 
ALGO-BU is not bottom-up efficient because the value of the package {1} identifies 
which package is optimal. Obviously, this example is contrived, but it is suggestive of 
the difficulties in constructing an algorithm which is bottom-up efficient for subclasses 
of QSM. 
An advantage of bottom-up algorithms is the degree to which they can be parallelized. 
If the set of projects N is decomposed into subsets {Ni ,  N2 , •• Nk} so that each project lies 
in at least one subset, but possibly more, i. e. the decomposition need not be a partition 
and a bottom-up algorithm is applied to each subset of projects, then the union of the 
optima for the subproblems necessarily is contained in, but not necessarily equal to the 
optimum for. the larger problem. An implication of this result is that if distinct, and 
possibly overlapping decision making authority is assigned to subsets of projects, the 
union of the resulting decisions will be contained in the optimal package of projects for 
the larger problem. 
8The difficulty of proving that ALGO-BU is not bottom-up efficient for QSM is that the decomposi­
tion basis coefficients for subsets of three or more projects can be negative for functions in QSM, which 
is not allowed in our constructive proof. 
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Appendix 
A Proofs of Bottom-Up Efficiency 
The appendix consists of two sections. In the first subsection, we provide a complete 
proof that ALGO-BU is bottom-up efficient for POS. In the second section section, we 
provide a sketch of the proof that ALGO-BU is bottom-up efficient for UNI. 
A.1 Positive Complementarities 
For any value function V which belongs to f i ( 19, PO S) , let /3v,1 denote its decomposition
basis coefficients. Our proof that ALGO-BU is bottom-up efficient relies on the con­
struction of two functions, the reduction of V in fi ( 19, POS) and the minimal reduction
of V in f i ( 19, PO S). Each is defined by its decomposition basis coefficients. 
The decomposition basis coefficients of the reduction of V in fi ( 19, POS) , rv j : S -1' �'
are defined as follows: 
f3rv,,l = /3v,I
f3rvj,I = -{j 
f3rvj,l = 0
if 3 i < j s.t. I �  Ti
if I I I= 1 and J3 i < j s.t I �  Ti
if I I 12:: 2 and /3,i < j s. t I �  Ti
Claim?? states that rv;, the reduction of V in ri( 19, POS) , belongs to ri( 19, POS).
Claim A.l . VE fi ( 19, POS) ::;. rvi E fi ( 19, POS) V 19 E POS 
pf: It suffices to show that V J  < j, V(T;) = rvj(T;) .  Note that f3rv,,I = /3v,1 V I  � T;
Therefore, 
V(T;) = L /3v,1 = L f3rv,,I = rv;(T;)
which completes the proof. 
ICT· ICT· - J - J 
In order to define the minimal reduction of V in ri ( 19, PO S), we first define the tested
package dominating I for any set of projects I C  N.
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The tested package dominating I up to j, DT (J, j) = n 
{T;: i<j, Is;T;} 
Claim ?? states that is the strong dominating set of X up to j is empty then the
tested package dominating I up to j is contained in X for any I contained in X. 
Claim A.2 SD( X, ri ( fi, POS) ) = 0 =? DT(I, j) � X V I � X.  
pf: By Claim ?? , i f  3 i � j, s. t. I � Ti, then 3 J such that T; � T i  and I � T; and
T; E S D( !, }) . By Corollary ?? , SD(I, }) � SD(I, j) and by Claim ?? , I � X and
S D( X, j) = 0 implies T; � X. 
The proof that ALGO-BU is bottom-up uses the minimal reduction of the value function, 
which places positive value only on those packages which have been evaluated. We defined 
the minimal reduction of V in r( fi, POS) in terms of its decomposition basis coefficients. 
The decomposition basis coefficients of the minimal reduction of V in fi( fi, POS) , 
mv; are defined as follows:
f3mv,,I 
f3mv;.I 
f3mv;,I 
= 0
= 0
= - 0 
f3mv,,I - L /3v,K 
{K:DT(K,j)=I} 
if I I I> 1 and ,ll i < j s.t. I =  Ti
if I I I=  1 and 3 i < j s.t. I C Ti
if I I I=  1 and ,ll i < j s.t I � Ti
if 3 i < j s.t. I =  Ti
Claim A.3 Given V, V Efi (fi, POS) , mv; ( X) = mv; (X) 'r/ X � N.
pf: By inspection, f3mv,,I = f3mv1,1 for all I �  N.
Given that the minimal reduction of V in fi ( fi, PO S) is independent of V, hereafter,
we denote it by fi; . We now show that the value of the reduction on V in fi ( fi, POS) 
equals the value of the minimal reduction on V in fi( fi, POS) for any package whose
strong dominating set in fi ( fi, POS) is empty.
Claim A.4 SD( X, fi ( fi, POS) ) = 0 => rvi(X) = fi;( X) V V E  fi ( fi, POS)
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pf: SD( X, j )  = 0. By Claim ??, SD( X, j )  = 0 :::} DT (J ,j )  � X V I � X .  Let
k = I  {x: x EX , x </.Ti for all'i < j} I · It follows that
rvj = -k
· 
0 + L f3v,1 
I�T ; 
Rearranging terms obtains 
which reduces to 
rvj = -k · 0 + L 
T;�X 
2: !3v,1 
{J:DT (l,j)=T ;} 
rvj = -k
· 
0 + L f3mv1,I 
T CX ,_ 
Therefore, rvj (X) = 19j( X) .  
We can now state the following corollary 
Corollary A.1 : V W, X � N, satisfying (i) - (iii):
(i) D( X, I'i ( 19, POS) ) = 0
(ii) D(W, ri ( 19, POS)) = 0 
(iii) w � x 
19i ( W) ::; 19i (X) :::} V(W) ::; V( X) V V  E I'i( 19, POS)
pf: By Claim ??, it suffices to show that for any V E  I'i ( 19, POS) , mvi ( W) ::; mvi( X)
implies V (W) ::; V( X).  Let B(W, j) = {I : I �  W, DT ( I , j)  = 0}. If W � X, then
B(W, j )  � B(X, j) .  Further, if I� W and /3v,1 =f:. /3r.,,,1 then-l-E B ( W) .  By construction, 
f3v,1 =/:- f3rv1,1. Therefore, f3v,1;::: f3rv,J· Define 8 as follows: 
8 = L (f3v,1 - f3rv1,l) - L (/3v,1 - f3rv1,I) 
lEB(X,j) IEB(W,j) 
By construction, V(X) - V(W) = rvj (X) - rvj ( W) + 8. and B(W) � B( X) implies
8;::: 0 .  Finally, by Claim ??, rvj (X) - rvj (W) = mt1j(X) - mt1j ( W) ,  which completes
the proof. 
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Corollary A.2 If D(X, fi ) = 0 and W c X ,  t9;(D(W, fi (t9 , POS)) )  < t9; (X) :;. 
V(W) $ V(X) V V  E fi(t9 , POS) 
pf: By Corollary ?? , if D(W, j) = 0 the proof is complete. If D(W, j )  =/= 0, then by
Corollary??, D(W, j )  � X. By Claim?? , V(D(W,j ) )  $ V(X) V V  E fi(t9 , POS). And, 
from the definition of D(W, j) ,  V(W) $ V(D(W,j ) )  V V  E ri (t9 , POS) , which completes
the proof. 
Claim ?? states that if the strong dominating set of X in fi ( {) , POS) is empty, then
there cannot exist a Y which contains X with a higher value under {)i · 
Claim A.5 SD(X, fi (t9 , POS)) = 0 :;.  ,ll Y s.t. X c Y and {)i (X) $ fJJ (Y)
pf: The proof is b y  contradiction. Suppose 3 Y s.t. X C Y and fJJ (X) $ {)j (Y) . Let
LD(X, j )  = {Y : X c Y, {)i (X) $ {)i (Y) ,  D(Y, j) = 0 } .  It follows that LD(X,j)  =I 0
and that 3 Y E  LD(X, j )  s. t. ,Zl Y E  LD(X, j )  s. t. Y c Y. 
It suffices to show that if LD(X, j )  =/= 0 ,  then Y belongs to SD(X, j ) ,  a contradiction. 
The proof proceeds in three parts. 
Part 1: V(X) $ V(Y) V V EG 
pf of part 1: By assumption, D(Y, j )  = 0 and {)i (Y) � {)i (X).  The result follows by
Corollary ?? . 
Part 2:  X �· y
pf of part 2:  By assumption, X C Y. 
Part 3 :  X c W c Y :;. V(W) $ V(Y) V V E G 
pf of part 3 :  Let W � N s. t. X C W C  Y. There are two possib ilities: 
( i ) D(W, j) = 0
( i i )  D(W, j) =/= 0
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Suppose first that (i) holds. By assumption, t?j (W) � t?; (Y) ,  and b y  Claim??, V(W) �
V(Y)V V E fi(t? ,  POS). Suppo se instead that (ii) holds. By C orollary ?? , D(W, j )  � Y,
and b y  assumption, t?,(D(W, j) )  � t?,(Y). By Claim ?? , V(D(W, j ) )  � V(Y) V V E
fi (t?, POS). From the definition of D(W, j),  V(W) � V(D( W, j )  V V E fJ (t?, POS), 
which completes the proof. 
Claim?? states that X is dominated in fJ (t9 ,  POS) if and only if the strong domi­
nating set of X in fi ( {}, POS) is nonempty. 
Claim A.6 X dominated in fi (iJ , POS) <=> SD(X, fi (t?, POS)) =J 0
pf: ( �) Follows from Claim ?? .
(:::} ) The proof is b y  contradiction. Suppose SD(X, j )  = 0 .  D(X, j )  = 0 b y  Claim ?? . 
It follows that V Y  s. t. X � Y, iJj (X) > iJ; (D(Y, j) )  � iJ; (Y) .  It suffi ces to show that
3 V E fi (iJ ,  POS) such that V(X) > V(Y) V Y  � N. Define the decomposition basis
coeffi cients for V as follows: 
/3v,1 = /3t'J1,1 I =J X 
/3v,x = max{iJ; (I) : I �  N, X � I} - iJ (X) + 1
There are two possib le cases. If X � Y then it follows that
V(Y) - V(X) = iJ (Y) - iJ; (X) < 0 
Alternatively, i f  X � Y, then it follows that
V(Y) - V(X) = iJi (Y) - iJ; (X) - /3v,x < 0 
, which completes the proof. 
Corollary ?? states that X is dominated if and only if its strong dominating package
is not empty. 
Corollary A.3 X dominated in fJ (t9,  POS) <=> D(X, fi (iJ , POS)) =J 0
pf: Follows from Claim ?? and Claim ?? . 
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Claim A. 7 If A bottom-up and optimizing for POS then Tn• 
num(A, {) ,  POS) 
pf: The proof proceeds in two parts: 
N , where n* 
Part 1 : \:/ {)  E POS and\:/ j < num(A, iJ , POS) ,  3 V E  fi (iJ , POS) s. t. N optimizes V 
pf of part 1 :  Let X optimize {) .  Define the decomposition basis coefficients of V as
follows: 
/3v,1 = (3191 ,I if I =/:- N 
/3v,x = /319,N + {) (X) - iJ (N) + 1
It follows that V E  fi ({) ,  POS) and N optimizes V. 
Part 2: If Ti = N, \:/ X C N, s. t. X =/:- T; for j < i , X  is  dominated.
pf of part 2: Suppose not. Let X maximize {) .  Let Bi be the best package located up to
iteration i . Define the decomposition basis coefficients of V E  fi (iJ ,  POS) as follows: 
/3v,1 = (3191 ,I if 1 =/:- N 
/3v,N = /319,N + (iJ (Bi ) - 19 (N))  + 0.5(19(X) - {) (Bi ) )  
I t  follows that Bi+l = N. Howev er, X optimizes{) , so there exists aj > i + l  s. t. X = Tj , 
but this contradicts the assumption that A is bottom-up. 
Claim A.8 ALGO-BU is bottom-up efficient for POS. 
pf. Claims ?? and Claim ?? state that ALGO-BU is optimi zing and b ot tom-up for G �
QSM. Therefore, it suffices to show that for any A which is bottom- up and optimizing
for POS, 3 V* E POS s. t. num(ALGO-BU,  V*) < num(A, V*) .  Let Zi denote the
i th package tested by A. A � ALGO-BU implies 3 V E POS s.t. Ti =/:- Zi for some
i .  Let j = min{i : Ti =/:- Zi } For i < j, Ti = Zi . Let r�( V,POS) = the class of
functions in POS consistent with V up to iteration i of the algorithm A. It follows
that r�(19 ,POS) = fi(19,POS) .  Let Bf denotes the best package up to iteration i of the
algorithm A. It follows that Bf = Bi . 
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The proof proceeds in two par ts : firs t, we crea te the function V•; s econd, we s how that
num(ALGO-BU, v• ) < num(A, v• ) .  
Let {)i denote the minimal reduction of V in fi (V,POS). B y  Cla im??, {)i E fi (V,POS) .
Define the decompos ition basis coefficients for Vo E fi ( V,POS) as follows:
/3v0 ,I = /3iJ i ,I for I =f:. Ti 
/3v0 ,T, = {)i (Bi) - {)i (Ti ) + 1
By cons tr uction, Bi+I = Ti . More importantly, Ti optimizes Vo. We now recurs ively
define Vi+t given Vi .  Let Tj+i be the (j + i )s t  package evaluated given Vi. Define the
decompos ition bas is coefficients of Vi+1 as follows : 
/3V;+1 ,l 
/3V;+1 ,Tj+i 
= /3V;,1 for I =f:. Ti+i 
= Vi(Bi+d - Vi(Ti+i ) + 1
It follows from Cla im ?? tha t Ti+i optimizes Vi. Moreover ,  given tha t Bi+i C Bi+i+I , it
follows that there exis ts a n  i• s uch tha t Ti+i• = N. Let V* = Vi• . It is s traightforwar d to
s how that for all i < i * ,  fk (Vi,POS) = fk(V• ,POS) for k � i .  Mor eover, for 0 � i � i • ,  
Ti+i = Bi+i+1 , a nd num(ALGO-BU, V* ) = j + i* .
It s uffi ces to s how (j + i• ) < num(A, V* ). By above v• E fi (V,POS) = I'� ( V,POS) .  
Given V,  let Z1c(V) denote the k th package evaluated by A given the function V, and let
Z1c denote the k th pa ckage eva lua ted by A given v·. We firs t s how tha t there exis ts an
a(O) > 0 s uch that Zi+a(o) = Ti . Choos e  b 2: 0 s uch tha t Ti 5; Zi+b and Ti g Zi+c for
c < b. We know that b exis ts by Claim ??. By cons tr uction, Vo(Zi+c) = v• (Zi+c) for
c < b. 
S uppos e  that Zi+b =f:. Ti . Define the decompos ition bas is coefficients for Vo as follows : 
= f3vo,I 
= Vo(Ti ) - Vo(Zi+b) - ! 
By ass umption, Zi+b rt Zi+c for 0 � c < b. Therefore, Zi(Vo) = Zi for i � j + b.
By cons truction Bf+b+I = Zj+b, however, Ti C Zi+b optimizes Vo, which contradicts , 
A bottom-up a nd optimizing. Therefore, Zi+b = Tj . Let a(O) = b. By ass umption,
Zi =f:. Ti , which implies a(O) > 0 .
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Giv en i E { 1 ,  . .  , i*} , we now prove by indu ction that there exis ts an a(i )  > i su ch that
Z;+a(i) = T;+i · We su ppos e it holds for (i - 1 ) ,  and s how that it mus t  hold for i .  By
the indu ctiv e  assu mption, there exis ts an a(  i - 1 )  > ( i - 1 )  su ch that Zj+a(i-t ) = Tj+i-1 
and Z;+a(i-l) CJ: Zk for any k < j + a(i - 1 ) .  Choos e b 2:. 0 su ch that T;+i � Zj+b and
T;+i CJ: Z;+c for c < b. Again, we know that b exis ts by Claim ?? . By cons tru ction, 
Vi(Z;+c) = V* (Z;+c) for c < b. Su ppos e  that Z;+b =j:. T;+i · 
Define the decompos itio n  bas is coefficients for � as fol ows : 
f3v,,r 
f3v, ,Z;+b 
= f3v.,1 for I =j:. Z;+b 
= Vi (T;+i ) - Vi(Z;+b ) - � 
By assu mption, Z;+b rt. Zj+c for 0 ::; c < b. Therefore, Zi("�) = Zi for i ::; j + b.
By cons tru ction Bf+b+1 = Zj+b , howev er, TJ+i C Z;+b optimizes Vo, which contradicts , 
A bottom-u p and optimizing. Therefore, ZJ+b = T;+i · Let a(i)  = b. By the indu ctiv e
assu mption, Zj+a(i-l) CJ: Zj+k for 0 ::;  k < a(i - 1 ) .  Therefore, a(i)  2:. [a(i- 1) + 1] > (i+ l) ,
which completes the proof that (j + i * )  < num(A, V*) .  
A.2 Unidirectional Complementarities 
For any v alu e fu nction V which bel ongs to ri (t? , UNI) ,  let f3v,1 denote its decompos ition
basis coefficients . The proof that ALGO-BU is bottom-u p efficient for UNI is s imilar to 
the proof for P OS. The only diff erence is in the cons tru ction of the minimal reduction of 
V in ri (t? , UNI) .  
The minimal reduction of t? in r( t? ,  UN I) is defined as foll ows : 
The decomposition basis coefficients of the minimal reduction of V in ri ( t? ,  UN I),
mv i are defined as follows:
f3mvj ,l 
f3mv; ,I 
f3mv; ,l 
= -0 
= -f3v,r 
L f3v,K 
{K:DT(K,j)=l} 
= 0  
if I 1 1= 1 and i < j s. t I �  Ti 
if I 1 1= 1 and 3 i < j s.i I � -Ti and 1 t/. Ti 
if I 1 1> 1 and 3 i ::; j s.t. I =  Ti and 1 E I
else 
The anal ogu es of Claim?? throu gh Cl aim?? fol ow with UNI subs titu ted for P OS. 
The cons tru ction of the Vi in the proof of bottom-u p efficiency diff ers s light ly, s o  the 
beginning of the proof is pres ented below: 
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Claim A.9 ALCO-BU is bottom-up efficient for UNI. 
pf. Claims?? and Claim?? state that ALGO-BU is optimizing and bottom-up for G �
QSM. Therefore, it suffices to show that for any A which is bottom-up and optimizing for
UNI , 3V* E UNI s. t. num(ALGO-BU , V* ) < num(A , V* ) . Let Zi denote the ith package
tested by A and r�(t9 ,UNI) be the set of functions which are consistent with A up to j. 
A¢. ALGO-BU implies 3 V E UNI s. t. Ti -:f:. Zi for some i .  Let j =min{ i : Ti #- Zi } If
1 ET; , then the proof is identical to the proof for POS. Therefore, we must only consider
the case where, 1 </. POS. By the definition of ALGO-BU , if 1 </. Tj , then there exists an
i E T; such that i </. T ;  'VJ < j. Let M* = m ax{xcN}{ I t9; (B; )  - t9;(X) I }  Define the
decomposition basis coefficients for Vo E fi ( t9 ,  UNI) as follows: 
/3v0,1 = /3-&j ,I for I -:f:. T; 
/3v0,i = t9(B;)  - t9 (T;) + M* + 1
By the construction of ALGO-BU , 1 E T;+i , so define Vi fo r i � 1 as in the proof fo r V E
POS. As before, there exists an i* , such that T;+i• = N. Let V* = v; •. It suffices to show
that there exists a a ( O) > 0 such that Z;+a(o) = T; , thereafter the proof is identical to 
the proof for POS. Choose b � 0 such that T; � Z;+b and T; C/,. Zi+c for c < b. We know
that b exists by Claim?? . By construction, Vo(Z;+c) = V*(Z;+c) for c < b. Suppose that
Z;+b -:f:. T; . If 1 </. Z;+b then let Vo = Vo. If 1 E Z;+b then define the decomposition basis
coefficients for Vo as follows: 
f3vo,1 
f3vo,Zi+b 
= /3v0,1vi for I #- Zi+b 
= Vo(T; )  
-
Vo(Z;+b) 
- ! 
By assumption, Z;+b � Z;+c for 0 :5 c < b. Therefore, in either case, Zi(Vo)  = Zi for
i :5 j + b. By construction Bf+b+t = Z;+b , however, T; C Z;+b optimizes Vo ,  which
contradicts, A bottom-up and optimizing. Therefore, Z;+b = T; . Let a ( O) = b. By 
assumption, Z; -:f:. T; , which implies a ( O) > 0 .  Hereafter, the proof is identical to the
proof for POS. 
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